


What works in reducing NEET rates: The Netherlands

1. Contextual information

1.1. Data

The rate of young people aged 15-24 and not in education, employment, or training (NEET) in the Netherlands has been among the lowest in the EU and OECD countries, remaining steadily under 5% since 2015, with the most recent data from 2023 pitting it at 3.3%.¹ The Netherlands is far ahead of the UK in terms of NEET rates, including those among the 15-29 year-olds: in 2022 the UK came in at 9.5% with the Netherlands at 4.5%.²

Figure 1: NEET rate among 15-29 year-olds (2001-2022)



Source: [Youth not in employment, education or training \(NEET\) | OECD](#)

An examination of NEET patterns in the Netherlands highlights some differences across various socio-demographic groups and educational backgrounds. The proportion of young people aged 15-25 who were NEET in the Netherlands was lower for those in the highest socio-economic areas compared to those in the lowest socio-economic areas; lower for those with a high educational attainment compared to those with a lower educational attainment;³ and lower for those with a native Dutch background compared to those with a non-Western migration background.⁴ Furthermore, young adults who were unavailable to work due to illness or disability made up the second largest group of young people aged 15-25 who were NEET.⁵ Similarly, regional disparities

¹ Eurostata.

² OECD.

³ Nederlands Jeugdinstituut (2025).

⁴ Perez and Lautenbach (2018).

⁵ Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2024).

are also evident in the UK.⁶ Notably, in the UK, foreign-born adults were less likely to be NEET compared to their UK-born counterparts⁷ – contrary to the Dutch case. Young adults with a Western migration background fall between their native Dutch counterparts and peers with a non-Western migration background.⁸

Similar patterns relate to wider contextual statistics. Despite a pronounced increase in **youth unemployment** for 15-24 year-olds in both countries following the 2008 financial crisis (and then the COVID pandemic), the metrics improved by 2024 placing the Netherlands ahead of the UK (8.7% and 14% respectively).⁹ In the Netherlands, this issue is particularly acute among young individuals lacking basic educational qualifications: in 2003, the youth unemployment rate of 11% for those with levels 0-2 (according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)) was 3 percentage points higher than the rate across all ISCED levels (11% vs 8.2%).¹⁰

The **employment rate** for the 15 to 24 year-olds in the Netherlands remains notably higher compared to the UK (76.5% vs 52.9% in 2023).¹¹ This is partly explained by the fact that combining school and work in the Netherlands is common, with many 15-26-year-olds in paid (albeit usually part-time) employment.¹² The youth minimum wage is a structural feature in the Netherlands providing further explanation for the high youth employment rate.¹³ This age-dependent minimum wage system is attractive both for employers and young adults alike, as it aims to promote employment opportunities for young people while recognising the evolving skills and productivity levels of younger workers.¹⁴ However, in terms of the employment rate for recent graduates the two countries nearly align: in 2019 (latest year for which data are available for both countries), the Netherlands reported 85.3% and the UK 81.0%.¹⁵

1.2. Policy landscape

These trends in youth NEET and employment rates offer a better understanding of how various policy approaches in the Netherlands and the UK may affected these disparities.



Over the past two decades, the Netherlands has implemented significant reforms to support youth employment, beginning with the 2004 Work and Social Assistance Act. This Act marked the initial step in decentralizing responsibilities by transferring the management of welfare and social assistance from the central



To address youth unemployment and NEET rates, the UK has implemented multiple policy reforms. The Work Programme²² (2011-2017) shifted employment support delivery to payment-by-results contracting.²³ In parallel, the Youth Contract²⁴ (2012-2015) provided wage incentives for employers and extra work experience placements

⁶ Office for National Statistics (2025).

⁷ Markaki and Sumption (2016).

⁸ Perez and Lautenbach (2018).

⁹ OECDa.

¹⁰ Eurostatb.

¹¹ OECDb.

¹² Department for Education (2024).

¹³ Rijksoverheid (2025a). <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/minimumloon/bedragen-minimumloon/bedragen-minimumloon-2024>

¹⁴ Kabátek (2021).

¹⁵ Eurostatc.

²² Department for Work & Pensions (2012).

²³ Department for Work & Pensions (2012).

²⁴ Mirza-Davies (2015).

government to municipalities.¹⁶ In 2013, the government, in collaboration with social partners, initiated labour market reforms to bolster the economy and improve prospects for young people, as outlined in the Social Pact of 2013.¹⁷ Further decentralisation took effect via the introduction of the Participation Act (Participatiewet) in 2015.¹⁸ It revised the Dutch activation policy for those between 18-27 years who would be entitled for social assistance benefits, and it introduces a four-week waiting period, during which applicants were expected to make serious efforts to find a job or return to their studies.¹⁹ This policy was piloted in 11 municipalities but its effects are difficult to interpret: 30-48% of young applicants did not return to claim benefits after the waiting period.²⁰ While these non-returners might have found a job and generated income, they might have also become NEET, with limited or no access to reintegration schemes.²¹

but faced implementation challenges²⁵ and lower-than-expected uptake of wage incentives.²⁶

Another transformation occurred with the introduction of Universal Credit (UC)²⁷ from 2013, replacing six existing benefits. For young people aged 18-24, this brought enhanced conditionality requirements and intensified job search expectations. The Youth Obligation Support Programme,²⁸ implemented from 2017, required young UC claimants to participate in an intensive activity programme during the first six months of their claim, including mandatory skills training or work experience.²⁹ It had varied effects across different demographic groups.³⁰

More recent developments focused on post-pandemic recovery. The Kickstart Scheme³¹ (2020-2022) aimed to create new jobs for 16-24-year-olds. The Youth Offer³² expanded the role of work coaches and introduced youth hubs - co-located support services bringing together local partners to deliver integrated employment and skills support.³³

¹⁶ Broersma, Edzes, and van Dijk (2012).

¹⁷ Cremers, Bekker, and Dekker (2017).

¹⁸ Rijksoverheid (2014).

¹⁹ Bekker (2020).

²⁰ Bekker (2020).

²¹ Bekker (2020).

²⁵ Newton et al. (2014).

²⁶ Department for Work & Pensions (2014).

²⁷ UK Government (2025).

²⁸ Department for Work & Pensions (2018).

²⁹ Powell (2021).

³⁰ Atfield and Green (2019).

³¹ UK Government (2020).

³² Department for Work & Pensions (2021).

³³ Department for Work & Pensions (2024).

2. Interventions: Youth wage subsidy and associated policies

Policies addressing NEET status in the Netherlands comprise an integrated framework of interventions operating at national, regional, and municipal levels.³⁴ While we acknowledge the Template for Intervention Description and Replication (TIDieR) framework as a useful tool for structuring intervention descriptions, the following section is not structured along this framework.³⁵ To enhance young people's transition into the labour market, these policies integrate:

- Financial support (e.g. the €8.5 billion National Programme Education³⁶ and supplementary funding for regional coordination and school-to-work transitions during economic downturns)³⁷
- Tailored career guidance (e.g. mandatory in secondary and tertiary education, including information on vocational education and training, VET)³⁸
- Vocational training (e.g. including a dedicated Foundation for Cooperation on Vocational Education, Training and Labour Market responsible for research, qualifications structure and accreditation of work placement companies)³⁹
- Structural reforms (e.g. the Work and Security Act which aims to improve job security for young people in temporary employment).

Table 1: Summary table outlining youth wage subsidy intervention characteristics⁴⁰

Intervention characteristic	Premium Subsidy for Young Workers (Premiekorling jongere werknemer)	Labour Cost Advantage (Loonkostenvoordeel)
Rationale	To encourage enterprises to hire young individuals	To encourage enterprises to hire individuals that face difficulties in the labour market
Target population	Young people aged 18-26 eligible for unemployment benefits	Workers who face difficulties, such as an occupational disability
Providers	Employers, Municipalities, Tax Authorities, Public Employment Services	Employers, Municipalities, Tax Authorities, Public Employment Services
Modes and locations of delivery	Premium discount of €3,500/year for a maximum duration of two years. The employment contract had to offer at least 32 hours/week. Location not applicable. ⁴¹	Reduction in employer wage costs through tax benefits of up to €6,000. Employers receive a fixed amount per hour worked by the eligible employee. Location not applicable. ⁴²

³⁴ European Commission (2023b).

³⁵ The interventions and policies discussed in this case study are not structured in a way that supports a description following the TIDieR framework's approach. Instead, this section is organised to provide a broader narrative that captures the context and scope of the policies, ensuring clarity without forcing alignment to the framework.

³⁶ Rijksoverheid (2021).

³⁷ Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2021).

³⁸ European Commission (2023a).

³⁹ SBB (2025).

⁴⁰ Structured using a condensed version of the TIDieR template.

⁴¹ Location is not applicable as this is a tax benefit.

⁴² Location is not applicable as this is a tax benefit.

Intervention characteristic	Premium Subsidy for Young Workers (Premiekorting jongere werknemer)	Labour Cost Advantage (Loonkostenvoordeel)
Duration	01 January 2014 - 01 January 2016, for a period of at least six months	Established in 2016 (replacing Premium Subsidy for Young Workers). Available for three years.
Modifications	Labour Cost Advantage was introduced.	Youth Labour Cost Advantage (LKV Jongeren), which was not adopted as an active policy.

Source: RAND Europe.

One key component are job subsidies and other demand-side employment incentives.⁴³ In 2014, the Dutch government introduced the **Premium Subsidy for Young Workers** (Premiekorting jongere werknemer) aimed at young people aged 18-26 who were eligible for unemployment benefits. In 2016, it was replaced by a new measure: Labour Cost Advantage (see below). The Premium Subsidy aimed to encourage enterprises to hire young individuals by offering a premium discount of €3,500 per year for employing young persons entitled to benefits, with a maximum duration of two years.⁴⁴ The employment had to begin on or after 01 January 2014 but before 01 January 2016, and the employee had to receive an employment contract of at least 32 hours per week, for a period of at least six months.⁴⁵

In addition to the Premium Subsidy, the Dutch government enacted the **Participation Act**⁴⁶ (2015), which changed the governance of social security and assistance.⁴⁷ It replaced several laws and further decentralised the responsibility for labour integration from the national to the local level (following the first significant shift as a result of the 2004 Work and Social Assistance Act). Municipalities were tasked with a bigger role in providing support to individuals with labour limitations, including counselling, additional training, supported employment, and reintegration trajectories.⁴⁸ The Act aimed to create over 100,000 jobs for disadvantaged groups within ten years,⁴⁹ one example being people with a disability who face difficulties finding a job because of it.⁵⁰ Young adults that are part of this target group are also more likely to be NEET.⁵¹ The policy has however faced criticism regarding the readiness of local governments to undertake these new responsibilities amidst budget cuts.⁵²

The participation of employers in government programmes and the efforts of providers to actively engage employers is key.⁵³ Underpinning this, the decentralisation through the Participation Act facilitated cooperation among the stakeholders, namely the Public Employment Services (PES), municipalities and 35 labour market regions, including the necessary engagement from employers. This illustrates the dual role of employer engagement⁵⁴ that seeks to enhance the effectiveness of active labour market

⁴³ Eichhorst and Rinne (2014).

⁴⁴ Južnik Rotar (2021); European Commission (n.d.).

⁴⁵ Rijksoverheid (2016).

⁴⁶ Rijksoverheid (2014).

⁴⁷ Buiskool, Broek, and Dente (2015).

⁴⁸ Buiskool, Broek, and Dente (2015).

⁴⁹ Buiskool, Broek, and Dente (2015).

⁵⁰ Rijksoverheid (2025b).

⁵¹ Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2024).

⁵² Delsen (2016).

⁵³ Orton et al. (2019).

⁵⁴ Ingold & Stuart in Orton et al. (2019).

programmes by ensuring that employers are not only incentivised to hire but are also actively involved in shaping and supporting these initiatives.⁵⁵

Labour Cost Advantage (Loonkostenvoordeel, LKV) introduced in 2018 replaced the Premium Subsidy.⁵⁶ The scheme provides a reduction in employer wage costs through tax benefits when hiring employees who face difficulties in the labour market, such as people with a disability.⁵⁷ Employers receive a fixed amount per hour worked by the eligible employee and the maximum annual benefit per employee can go up to €6,000.⁵⁸ The duration of the LKV benefit is typically three years. While the wage cost benefits are lower per employee, the new measure introduced that more employers can use the LKV.⁵⁹ Moreover, under the LKV employers can also receive wage cost benefits for interns, which might be particularly attractive in relation to young people who are NEET.⁶⁰

Information on overall **costs** was not included for this case study due to a lack of available evidence in the sources reviewed.

3. Outcomes and considerations for future initiatives

The success of these measures remains contingent on many variables, including effective implementation and coordination at the local level and the availability of funding. Below, we discuss evidence available for subsidised employment programmes in the Netherlands.

Early subsidised employment programmes showed a spectrum of results, highlighting both successes and areas for improvement. One study examined their effectiveness for people aged between 20–24 registered as unemployed in 2008 using difference-in-differences and matching design.⁶¹ In the short term, the subsidies have been effective in enhancing employment and educational outcomes (an average treatment effect on the treated of 1.7% for the re-employment probability and of 5.5% for the probability of engaging in regular studies one year after the programme start).⁶² This positive impact on re-employment, though beneficial, is relatively small and short-lived. Two years after the programme's commencement the probability of re-employment decreases by 6.0% (the probability of engaging in studies is increased but only by 0.5%).⁶³ This decline suggests that while initial support is beneficial, this programme may have inadvertently become counterproductive over time, although alternative explanations are provided in the reviewed literature, including the delayed effects of the financial crisis.⁶⁴ This finding is broadly in line with other studies, including those in the Youth Futures Evidence

⁵⁵ Orton et al. (2019).

⁵⁶ Rijksoverheid (2024a).

⁵⁷ Rijksoverheid (2024a).

⁵⁸ Rijksoverheid (2024b).

⁵⁹ Rijksoverheid (2024a).

⁶⁰ Rijksoverheid (2024a).

⁶¹ Južnik Rotar (2021).

⁶² Južnik Rotar (2021).

⁶³ Južnik Rotar (2021).

⁶⁴ Južnik Rotar (2021).

Toolkit,⁶⁵ that show subsidies have a modest employment effect (one stronger than training, as they increase the outflow rate from unemployment to employment).⁶⁶

Overall, we found limited evidence on the effectiveness of Dutch policies and interventions targeting youth who are NEET. There is little transparency about ALMP participation and drop-outs, thus limiting the extent to which conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness of the wage subsidy interventions discussed above or Participation Act's financial incentives.⁶⁷

A recent analysis was unable to draw definitive conclusions for the effectiveness of LKVs for disadvantaged young people due to the lack of suitable comparison group.⁶⁸ It found that the LKV scheme was rarely used by employers for young disadvantaged people. Subsequent studies shed more light on this aspect. First, employers who use LKV and those who do not, despite employing individuals from the LKV target groups, differ in terms of company size and sector.⁶⁹ Second, the profile of new recruits also differs – new workers at non-LKV companies tend to have longer contracts with more hours and higher wages compared with those at LKV-companies.⁷⁰

A **proposed Youth Labour Cost Advantage** (LKV Jongeren) scheme was also examined, focusing on how well it targets vulnerable⁷¹ young people and what adjustments could improve its effectiveness.⁷² The proposed scheme envisages that employers would receive a wage cost advantage for workers who are aged 18–26 years, work at least 1,248 hours per year (24 hours per week), and earn 100–125% of the statutory (youth) minimum wage. The analysis suggests that lowering the age limit (from 26 to 24 years) and adjusting the hours criteria (shifting to a quarterly/monthly hours calculation instead of annual) could improve the targeting of the proposed measure without major financial trade-offs.⁷³

4. Lessons relevant for the UK context

Target population: Youth Labour Cost Advantage primarily targets individuals aged 18–26, which is slightly older than the population of interest in this study (i.e., young people aged 14–24 who are NEET). This difference presents a limitation, as the intervention's focus on integrating participants directly into the workforce may not fully address the needs of the younger sub-group within the NEET population. For younger individuals, particularly those under 18, support may need to prioritize pathways into education before employment to align with their developmental stage and long-term prospects. Nonetheless, aligning the intervention with the NEET-associated risk factors (such as lack of qualifications or socio-economic barriers⁷⁴) could enhance its transferability across

⁶⁵ Nancarrow et al. (2023).

⁶⁶ Kluve et al. (2007).

⁶⁷ Wesseling (2020).

⁶⁸ Schwartz, van der Werff, and Kroon (2021); Doeve et al. (2023).

⁶⁹ Doeve et al. (2023).

⁷⁰ Doeve et al. (2023).

⁷¹ Defined as youth without a qualification or youth with qualifications but with other risk factors (e.g., low job security, lack of experience, or financial instability).

⁷² Schwartz, van der Werff, and Kroon (2021).

⁷³ Schwartz, van der Werff, and Kroon (2021).

⁷⁴ Forthcoming study exploring NEET risk factors

age groups. For example, the intervention could incorporate tailored educational support programs aimed at younger NEET individuals, such as vocational training or foundational skill-building courses. Additionally, addressing socio-economic barriers might involve providing subsidized transportation, access to childcare, or financial incentives to reduce the costs associated with participation. By tailoring its strategies to address these barriers the intervention could better support the younger NEET population, ensuring its applicability beyond the original target demographic.

Implementation: The Youth Labour Cost Advantage was not adopted as an active policy in the Netherlands⁷⁵ and the feasibility to adapt it to the UK context depends on funding available and implementation capacity. The Premium Subsidy had an implementation cost of €300 million and was delivered through local municipalities.⁷⁶ The UK would need to tailor the scheme to fit its fiscal, regulatory and institutional environment – experience gained in previous wage subsidy programmes (e.g. Youth Contract, Kickstart) would facilitate such adaptations ensuring alignment with local governance structures and funding mechanisms.⁷⁷

Environment: The policy settings between the UK and the Netherlands seem to be to some extent comparable: both policy settings include forms of welfare conditionality and sanctions that individuals must fulfil to receive benefits.

The key difference appears to be that the Netherlands has created robust institutional structures for coordination and collaboration, while maintaining flexibility in implementation, whereas the UK often relies on specific initiatives or programmes that may lack the same level of systematic integration. Therefore, the main lessons for the UK are:

- The Netherlands demonstrates **the value of having clearly defined regional coordination structures** through its 35 labour market regions, each with concrete plans and local stakeholder involvement. While the UK has made steps in this direction with Youth Hubs, the Dutch model shows how to maintain consistent national strategic direction while enabling genuine local flexibility. A key lesson is how the Dutch system integrates education providers, employers, and municipalities within these regional structures, rather than treating them as separate policy streams. The UK could strengthen its regional approach by:
 - Creating more formalised regional coordination bodies with clear mandates
 - Ensuring systematic involvement of all key stakeholders at the regional level
 - Maintaining clearer links between national strategy and regional implementation
- The Dutch Foundation for Cooperation on Vocational Education, Training and Labour Market provides a systematic way for employers to influence curriculum content and ensure labour market relevance. While the UK has employer involvement in apprenticeships and T-levels, the Dutch model shows how to

⁷⁵ The youth labour cost advantage was intended to replace the low-income benefit for young people (Jeugd-LIV (Lage-inkomstenvoordeel)), which was abolished due to limited effectiveness. Similarly, it was expected that the youth labour cost advantage would only reach the intended target group to a limited effect; thus the Rutte IV government decided not to introduce the alternative instrument. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2023-2024).

⁷⁶ European Commission (n.d.).

⁷⁷ Nancarrow et al. (2023).

create more comprehensive and sustained collaboration between education and employers. The UK could consider:

- Establishing a more formalised institutional bridge between vocational education and employers
- Creating mechanisms for systematic employer input into curriculum development
- Building stronger links between career guidance (including VET) and labour market intelligence.

Outcomes:

- Reported outcomes:
 - Initial financial incentives can effectively enhance short-term employment and educational participation among young people. However, an initial positive impact on employment and education may not sustain over time,⁷⁸ and the sustainability of these outcomes may differ between the Netherlands and the UK.
 - Active participation and engagement of employers are essential to the success of such interventions. Employers need to be aware, incentivised and involved in shaping similar initiatives.⁷⁹
 - Continuous monitoring and evaluation are necessary to understand the intervention's effectiveness, including transparency about participation, non-participation, and dropout rates.⁸⁰
- **Quality appraisal of the study design and identified limitations:** Mixed-methods approaches were employed in the studies reviewed, but no limitations were identified (Annex 1).
- **Key success factors:** While the youth labour cost advantage was not introduced as an active policy in the Netherlands, Schwartz, van der Werff, and Kroon (2021) provide valuable insights into the parameters that would ensure the benefit reaches the most appropriate section of the target group. The research shows that the effectiveness of targeting depends heavily on how vulnerability is defined and which groups are included. Their analysis highlights two critical aspects for success.⁸¹
 - First, the intervention must effectively target young people without a basic qualification - this group is assumed to be particularly vulnerable in the labour market.
 - Second, the intervention must also account for young people with a basic qualification who are still considered (potentially) vulnerable due to other socio-economic factors. To achieve this, a clear definition of 'young people with a (potentially) vulnerable labour market position who do have a basic qualification' is essential for identifying and reaching this subgroup effectively.
 - The design of the LKV youth could be adjusted to improve its focus. For instance, lowering the 'hours standard' (Uurloonnorm) would increase the focus, allowing more jobs to qualify for the LKV youth. This adjustment

⁷⁸ Južnik Rotar (2021).

⁷⁹ Orton et al. (2019).

⁸⁰ Wesseling (2020).

⁸¹ Schwartz, van der Werff, and Kroon (2021).

would lead to a significant rise in jobs filled by (potentially) vulnerable young people with a basic qualification, though it would slightly reduce the relative share of jobs filled by young people without a basic qualification.

- Notably, the LKV was ultimately not introduced as an active policy due to concerns about its effectiveness in reaching the intended target groups.⁸² These concerns underscore the importance of designing interventions that are both precisely targeted and adaptable to the needs of vulnerable populations.

Methods

Data analysis: We analysed available statistical data on the NEET rates.

Document review: We used forward and backward citation searches from the sources identified as part of the main REA. The full list of sources consulted is presented in Notes and References.

PIET-T model: A conceptual model, that assumes that a combination of three elements (population, intervention, and environment) determines the outcomes of an intervention, was used to aid considerations for transferring interventions into other contexts.⁸³

Template for Intervention Description and Replication (TIDieR):⁸⁴ This was used to record – where possible – (i) name of the intervention; (ii) rationale or theory essential to the intervention; (iii) materials, procedures and activities used; (iv) details on providers and expertise needed; (v) modes and locations of delivery; (vi) duration, intensity and dose; (vii) information on personalised elements; (viii) modifications introduced; and (ix) implementation fidelity.

For the methodology used to select the case studies, and a full description of the methods, please see the final report: [Hofman, J., Hutton, E. & Nightingale, M. \(2025\). What Works: Reducing NEET Rates. Youth Futures](#)

⁸² Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2023-2024).

⁸³ Schloemer and Schröder-Bäck. (2018).

⁸⁴ Hoffmann, et al. (2014).

References

- Atfield, G, and A Green. 2019. *From Obligation to opportunity: The impact of the Youth Obligation on disadvantaged young people*. Centrepont.
<https://centrepont.org.uk/sites/default/files/2023-06/5-from-obligation-to-opportunity.pdf>.
- Bekker, S. 2020. "Towards an inclusive labour market: ambitions of the Dutch Public Employment Service."
- Broersma, L, A Edzes, and J van Dijk. 2012. "Have Dutch Municipalities Become More Efficient in Managing the Costs of Social Assistance Dependency?*" *Journal of Regional Science* 53 (2): 274-291. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9787.2012.00762.x>.
- Buiskool, B, S Broek, and G Dente. 2015. *The Social and Employment Situation in the Netherlands and Outlook on the Dutch EU Presidency 2016*. European Parliament.
- Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. 2024. *Landelijke Jeugdmonitor 2024*. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Den Haag/Heerlen/Bonaire). <https://longreads.cbs.nl/jeugdmonitor-2024/jongeren-die-geen-onderwijs-volgen-en-niet-werken/>.
- Cremers, J, S Bekker, and R Dekker. 2017. "The Dutch polder model: Resilience in times of crisis." In *Talking through the crisis: Social dialogue and industrial relations trends in selected EU countries*, 189-212. ILO.
- Delsen, L. 2016. *The realisation of the participation society. Welfare state reform in the Netherlands: 2010-2015*.
- Department for Education. 2024. "Graduate labour market statistics." Accessed 10.1.25. <https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/graduate-labour-markets>.
- Department for Work & Pensions. 2012. *The Work Programme*. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7994fbed915d0422069889/the-work-programme.pdf>.
- . 2014. *Evaluation of the Youth Contract wage incentive*. Department for Work & Pensions. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7c5b5f40f0b660183b6d1d/rr864-youth-contract-wage-incentives-2.pdf>.
- . 2018. "Support for 18 to 21 year olds claiming Universal Credit." UK Government. Accessed 14.2.25. <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/support-for-18-to-21-year-olds-claiming-universal-credit>.
- . 2021. "Help to find work for Universal Credit claimants aged 16 to 24." UK Government. Accessed 14.2.25. <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/help-to-find-work-for-universal-credit-claimants-aged-18-to-24#youth-employment-programme>.
- . 2024. *Youth Offer process evaluation*. Department for Work & Pensions. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/youth-offer-process-evaluation/youth-offer-process-evaluation#introduction-and-methodology>.
- Doeve, T, T Vervliet, L de Ruig, J Talman, and Y ten Have. 2023. *Niet-gebruik van het loonkostenvoordeel*. Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (De Beleidsonderzoekers). <https://www.seo.nl/publicaties/niet-gebruik-van-het-loonkostenvoordeel/>.

Eichhorst, W, and U Rinne. 2014. "Promoting Youth Employment Through Activation Strategies." No. 163.

European Commission. 2023a. "3.4 Career guidance and counselling." <https://national-policies.eacea.ec.europa.eu/youthwiki/chapters/netherlands/34-career-guidance-and-counselling>.

---. 2023b. "3.6 Integration of young people in the labour market." <https://national-policies.eacea.ec.europa.eu/youthwiki/chapters/netherlands/36-integration-of-young-people-in-the-labour-market>.

---. n.d. *Dutch initiatives to prevent and tackle youth unemployment*. <https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=16481&langId=en>.

Eurostat. Young people neither in employment nor in education and training by sex, age and labour status (NEET rates). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/EDAT_LFSE_20_custom_14904251/default/table?lang=en

Eurostatb. Youth unemployment by sex, age and educational attainment level. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/YTH_EMPL_090/default/table?lang=en

Eurostatc. Employment rates of young people not in education and training by sex, educational attainment level and years since completion of highest level of education. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/edat_lfse_24/default/table?lang=en

Južnik Rotar, L. 2021. "Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Employment Programme on Young Unemployed People." *Engineering Economics* 32 (1): 60-69. <https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.ee.32.1.23276>.

Kabátek, J. 2021. "Happy birthday, you're fired! Effects of an age-dependent minimum wage on youth employment flows in the Netherlands." *ILR Review* 74 (4): 1008-1035.

Kluve, J, D Card, M Fertig, M Gora, L Jacobi, P Jensen, R Leetmaa, L Nima, E Patacchini, S Schaffner, C. M Schmidt, B Van Der Klaauw, and A Weber. 2007. *Active Labor Market Policies in Europe*.

Markaki, Y, and M Sumption. 2016. *Young Migrants in the UK Labour Market*. University of Oxford.

Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. 2021. Kamerbrief Voortgang uitwerking aanvullend sociaal pakket.

Mirza-Davies, J. 2015. *Youth Contract*. House of Commons Library. <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06387/SN06387.pdf>.

Nancarrow, A, D Muir, B Rosolin, C Orlando, B Newton, J Rowland, E Ott, and A Shlonsky. 2023. *The impact of wage subsidies on the employment of disadvantaged and/or marginalised young people*. Youth Futures Foundation.

Nederlands Jeugdinstituut. 2025. "Cijfers over jeugdwerkloosheid." Accessed 28.3.25. <https://www.nji.nl/cijfers/jeugdwerkloosheid>.

Newton, B, S Speckesser, V Nafilyan, S Maguire, D Devins, and T Bickerstaffe. 2014. *The Youth Contract for 16-17 year olds not in education, employment or training evaluation*. Institute for Employment Studies. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a74a268e5274a410efd12ce/RR318A_-_The_youth_contract_for_16-_to_17-year-olds_not_in_education_employment_or_training_evaluation.pdf.

OECDa. Monthly Unemployment Rates. [https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?df\[ds\]=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&df\[id\]=DSD_LFS%40DF_IALFS_UNE_M&df\[ag\]=OECD.SDD.TPS&df\[vs\]=1.0&pd=2020%2C2024&dq=NLD%2BFRA%2BDNK%2BGBR%2BAUS..._Z.Y.F%2BM%2B_T.Y15T24..A&ly\[rw\]=REF_AREA&ly\[cl\]=TIME_PERIOD&to\[TIME_PERIOD\]=false&vw=tb](https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?df[ds]=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&df[id]=DSD_LFS%40DF_IALFS_UNE_M&df[ag]=OECD.SDD.TPS&df[vs]=1.0&pd=2020%2C2024&dq=NLD%2BFRA%2BDNK%2BGBR%2BAUS..._Z.Y.F%2BM%2B_T.Y15T24..A&ly[rw]=REF_AREA&ly[cl]=TIME_PERIOD&to[TIME_PERIOD]=false&vw=tb)

OECDb. Employment Rate. [https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?fs\[0\]=Topic%2C1%7CEmployment%23JOB%23%7CEmployment%20indicators%23JOB_EMP%23&pg=0&fc=Topic&bp=true&snb=37&vw=tb&df\[ds\]=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&df\[id\]=DSD_LFS%40DF_IALFS_EMP_WAP_Q&df\[ag\]=OECD.SDD.TPS&df\[vs\]=1.0&dq=GBR%2BNLD.EMP_WAP.._Z.Y._T.Y15T24..A&pd=2001%2C&to\[TIME_PERIOD\]=false&ly\[cl\]=TIME_PERIOD&ly\[rw\]=REF_AREA](https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?fs[0]=Topic%2C1%7CEmployment%23JOB%23%7CEmployment%20indicators%23JOB_EMP%23&pg=0&fc=Topic&bp=true&snb=37&vw=tb&df[ds]=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&df[id]=DSD_LFS%40DF_IALFS_EMP_WAP_Q&df[ag]=OECD.SDD.TPS&df[vs]=1.0&dq=GBR%2BNLD.EMP_WAP.._Z.Y._T.Y15T24..A&pd=2001%2C&to[TIME_PERIOD]=false&ly[cl]=TIME_PERIOD&ly[rw]=REF_AREA)

Office for National Statistics. (2025). Dataset: Young people not in education, employment or training (NEET). <https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplenotinwork/unemployment/datasets/youngpeoplenotineducationemploymentortrainingneetable1>

Orton, M, A Green, G Atfield, and S Barnes. 2019. "Employer participation in active labour market policy: from reactive gatekeepers to proactive strategic partners." *Journal of Social Policy* 48 (3): 511-528.

Perez, S A, and H Lautenbach. 2018. *NEETs: jongeren die geen opleiding volgen en niet werken*. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (The Hague).

Powell, A. 2021. *NEET: Young people Not in Education, Employment or Training*. House of Commons Library. <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06705/SN06705.pdf>.

Rijksoverheid. 2014. Participatiewet.

---. 2016. Wet financiering sociale verzekeringen.

---. 2021. BIJLAGE NATIONAAL PROGRAMMA ONDERWIJS STEUNPROGRAMMA VOOR HERSTEL EN PERSPECTIEF. edited by Cultuur en Wetenschap Ministerie van Onderwijs.

---. 2024a. "Loonkostenvoordelen (LKV)." Accessed 10.1.25. <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/wet-tegemoetkomingen-loondomein-wtl/tegemoetkoming-loonkosten-oudere-jongere-of-gehandicapte-werknemers/loonkostenvoordelen-lkv>.

---. 2024b. *Vragen en antwoorden met betrekking tot de Wet tegemoetkomingen loondomein (Wtl)*. Ministerie Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/wet-tegemoetkomingen-loondomein-wtl/documenten/brochures/2017/08/28/kennisdocument-wtl>.

---. 2025a. "Bedragen minimumloon 2024." Accessed 31/3/2025. <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/minimumloon/bedragen-minimumloon/bedragen-minimumloon-2024>.

---. 2025b. "Kan ik met mijn arbeidsbeperking hulp krijgen om (weer) aan het werk te gaan?". Accessed 31/3/25. <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/participatiewet/vraag-en-antwoord/kan-ik-met-mijn-arbeidsbeperking-hulp-krijgen-om-weer-aan-het-werk-te-gaan>.

SBB. 2025. "SBB brings senior secondary vocational education and business together." Accessed 2025. <https://www.s-bb.nl/en/>.

Schwartz, T, S van der Werff, and L Kroon. 2021. *Vormgeving en gerichtheid LKV jongeren*. Ministerie van Sociale Zaken & Werkgelegenheid (SEO Economisch Onderzoek). <https://www.seo.nl/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/2021-18-Vormgeving-en-gerichtheid-LKV-jongeren.pdf>.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. 2023-2024. Wijziging van de Wet tegemoetkomingen loondomein teneinde het lage inkomensvoordeel te laten vervallen en in verband met enkele andere wijzigingen.

UK Government. 2020. "Kickstart Scheme." Accessed 14.2.25. <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/kickstart-scheme>.

---. 2025. "Universal Credit." Accessed 14.2.25. <https://www.gov.uk/universal-credit>.

Wesseling, W I E. 2020. "Active Labor Market Programs for Youth: The Numbers Tell the Tale?" In *International Perspectives on the youth labor market: Emerging Research and Opportunities*, 51-73. IGI Global.

Annex 1. Methods used in the reviewed studies

Table 2: Methodology used in the reviewed studies and stated limitations

Source	Methodology	Limitations
Juznik Rotar (2021).	Uses difference in differences propensity score matching to estimate the treatment effect of subsidized employment programmes on young Dutch unemployed people.	Not mentioned.
Schwart, van der Werff et al. (2021).	Mixed-methods approach including a literature review to define the parameters of the definition of 'young people with a vulnerable position'. This study determines the extent to which the design of the youth labour cost advantage influences the parameters of the instrument using administrative data.	Not mentioned.
Doeve, Vervliet et al. (2023).	Mixed-methods approach with a combination of qualitative methods (literature review, interviews with experts, focus groups) and the analysis of administrative data to map the characteristics of employers who have (not) used the labour cost advantage.	Not mentioned.

Source: RAND Europe.